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FORUM SHOPPING COVID-19 BUSINESS 
INTERRUPTION INSURANCE CLAIMS 
Christopher C. French∗ 
Insurance disputes are typically governed by state law, and state in-
surance laws vary considerably, with some states being favorable to poli-
cyholders and others being unfavorable. With forum shopping, a plaintiff 
often has many choices regarding where it can bring a lawsuit, including 
multiple states in which to bring the case and whether to bring the case in 
federal or state court. Of the over 1000 COVID-19 business interruption 
insurance lawsuits filed thus far, more than 700 of them have been filed in, 
or removed to, federal court, with more than 250 of the cases filed as class 
actions. Many of them were also filed in states with insurance laws that are 
not favorable to policyholders.  
Conventional wisdom provides that a plaintiff’s chances of winning 
are generally much higher in state court than in federal court and that his-
torically federal class actions against insurers have been successful only 
approximately twenty-five percent of the time. So, why were so many of the 
COVID-19 business interruption insurance cases filed in federal court in 
unfavorable states and as class actions when the historical chances of win-
ning are so low in such forums, particularly as class actions? 
This Essay provides some possible answers to that question. In doing 
so, it explores forum shopping considerations in general, the conventional 
wisdom regarding litigating in federal versus state court, and the empirical 
data regarding the odds of winning in state versus federal court.  
I. INTRODUCTION AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM REGARDING 
INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION  
In addition to huge losses by large businesses, small businesses were esti-
mated to be losing $255 to $431 billion per month due to government-ordered 
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COVID-19 shutdowns.1 The United States Department of Labor estimates that 
forty percent of businesses never reopen after experiencing a disaster that shuts 
down their operations.2 Of the businesses that reopen, at least twenty-five per-
cent fail within two years.3 
In an attempt to avoid becoming a business that cannot recover following a 
disaster, many of the businesses impacted by the government-ordered COVID-
19 shutdowns had purchased “all risk” business interruption insurance.4 Busi-
ness interruption insurance is intended to replace the policyholder’s revenue 
stream in the event the policyholder’s business operations are shut down due to 
a non-excluded peril. 5 When insurers, in mass, began denying coverage for 
COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims, policyholders began filing 
hundreds of lawsuits against their insurers seeking to obtain coverage.6 
As of September 15, 2020, over 1000 business interruption insurance law-
suits had been filed.7 Of those 1000-plus lawsuits, more than 700 of them were 
pending in federal court, with over 250 of them filed as class actions.8 And, many 
of the lawsuits were filed in states, such as Ohio and New York, which are gen-
erally understood by experienced insurance coverage counsel to have insurance 
laws that are not particularly favorable for policyholders.9 
The stakes for the parties in this litigation could not be higher. In the ab-
sence of a government bailout, both the policyholders and insurers face potential 
 
 1. Press Release, Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, APCIA Releases New Business Interruption Analysis (Apr. 
6, 2020), http://www.pciaa.net/pciwebsite/cms/content/viewpage?sitePageId=60052 [https://perma.cc/W5B3-
WBYR].  
 2. John Grossmann, A Business Ponders Whether its Location is Perfect, or a Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
7, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/business/smallbusiness/a-business-tries-to-decide-whether-its-
location-is-perfect-or-a-disaster.html [https://perma.cc/979L-BRZW].  
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover from Their Insurer for 
Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L. J. 783, 785 (1989) (“In an ‘all-risk’ policy, all losses except 
those specifically excluded are covered. This is the broadest form of coverage and has been so interpreted by the 
courts.”) (emphasis in original).  
 5. See, e.g., Cont’l Ins. Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Nw. States Portland 
Cement Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 360 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1966)) (“The purpose of business interruption in-
surance is to protect the insured against losses that occur when its operations are unexpectedly interrupted, and 
to place it in the position it would have occupied if the interruption had not occurred.”). See also Gregory D. 
Miller & Joseph D. Jean, Effect of Post-Loss Economic Factors in Measuring Business Interruption Losses: An 
Insured’s and Insurer’s Perspectives, in New Appleman on Insurance: Current Critical Issues in Insurance 
Law 25, 25 (2010) (“Business interruption insurance, at its core, is intended to place the insured in the position 
it would have been in had it not suffered a loss.”).  
 6. See APCIA Releases New Business Interruption Analysis, supra note 1 (“Many commercial insurance 
policies, including those that have business interruption coverage, do not provide coverage for communicable 
diseases or viruses such as COVID-19. Pandemic outbreaks are uninsured because they are uninsurable.”); Julia 
Jacobs, Arts Groups Fight Their Insurers Over Coverage on Virus Losses, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/arts/insurance-claims-coronavirus-arts.html [https://perma.cc/ZG7G-
N6LK]. 
 7. See CCLT Case List, UNIV. PENN. CAREY L. SCH., https://cclt.law.upenn.edu/cclt-case-list/ 
[https://perma.cc/9NKF-C8VU] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
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bankruptcy if they lose.10 So, one would expect that the policyholders’ counsel 
carefully analyzed various states’ insurance laws and then selected the forums 
most favorable to their policyholder clients when bringing the lawsuits. 
Yet, many of the policyholders’ counsel’s choices regarding where to file 
the lawsuits are at odds with the conventional wisdom regarding the best forums 
for litigating insurance cases. Conventional wisdom provides that policyholders 
are better off suing in state court than federal court.11 This is because state judges 
often are elected and serve in the same communities as the plaintiffs.12 Likewise, 
the juries in state court are also from the immediate area in which the court is 
located, unlike federal court jury pools that encompass a much larger geographic 
area.13 State court judges generally are also less likely to dismiss a case based on 
a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.14 For all these reasons, 
conventional wisdom dictates that plaintiffs are better off in state court than fed-
eral court for most types of cases, including insurance cases. Insurance Defense 
Strategy 101, on the other hand, dictates that, for the opposite reasons, insurers 
prefer to litigate in federal court, and they should remove state court cases to 
federal court whenever possible. 
In addition, most insurance disputes, including the COVID-19 business in-
terruption cases, are governed by state insurance law, which varies from state to 
state, with some states’ laws favoring policyholders and others favoring insur-
ers.15 So, to the extent they have choices, one would expect policyholders’ coun-
sel to be selective in deciding which state’s laws are the most favorable for their 
 
 10. See APCIA Releases New Business Interruption Analysis, supra note 1. 
 11. See, e.g., Mark S. Humphreys, Suing An Insurance Company – Federal Or State Court?, DALL. FORTH 
WORTH INS. LAW. BLOG (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.dallasfortworthinsurancelawyerblog.com/suing-an-insur-
ance-company-federal-or-state-court/ [https://perma.cc/GS3S-P4BC] (“It is well known among insurance law-
yers that an insurance company always wants to have its lawsuit contested in Federal Court.”); Max Kennerly, 
Why Civil Defendants Want to Be in Federal Court: Judicial Vacancies, LITIG. & TRIAL (Jan. 7, 2013), 
https://www.litigationandtrial.com/2013/01/articles/series/special-comment/judicial-vacancies/ 
[https://perma.cc/CPJ8-QMJU] (“[I]t’s lawyer’s lore that federal courts are better for defendants while  state 
courts are better for plaintiffs.”); Walter J. Andrews et al., Not So Fast: Federal Court Blocks Insurers’ Bid to 
Remove to Federal Court, LAW.COM (Mar. 28, 2019, 10:45 AM), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessre-
view/2019/03/28/not-so-fast-federal-court-blocks-insurers-bid-to-remove-to-federal-court/?slre-
turn=20200813001253 [https://perma.cc/D22D-Y338] (“Florida insureds generally prefer to have their insurance 
coverage disputes decided in Florida state courts, where they are more familiar and where the judges and juries 
tend to be from the same local area as the insureds. Insurers often prefer federal courts for the same reasons . . . .”). 
 12. See, e.g., Andrews et al., supra note 11. 
 13. See, e.g., Kennerly, supra note 11. 
 14. See, e.g., Kennerly, supra note 11. 
 15. See, e.g., PETER J. KALIS ET AL., POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE § 
26.03[B] (1st ed. 1997 & Supp. 2020) (“Insurance contracts are interpreted according to state law. Not surpris-
ingly, the manner in which the courts of the various states address similar interpretive issues can vary widely 
from one state to the next.”); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 553–
54 (1996) (“Conflicts scholars don’t fight bitterly about the differences among approaches [to determining choice 
law] because we disagree about their aesthetic qualities. We fight because the differences matter in terms of 
outcomes.”).  
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lawsuits in order to maximize both their chances of winning and the size of the 
awards if they do win.16  
Consequently, it is surprising that more than 700 of the COVID-19 business 
interruption insurance lawsuits have been filed in, or removed to, federal court, 
with many of them in states that generally are understood by insurance coverage 
attorneys to favor insurers. Several questions thus come to mind when consider-
ing the choices made by the policyholders’ counsel regarding the selection of the 
forums for the litigation. Are the policyholders’ counsel who are bringing the 
COVID-19 business interruption loss lawsuits uninformed regarding insurance 
law and the conventional wisdom regarding state versus federal court? Is the 
conventional wisdom regarding which forums are the most favorable to policy-
holders wrong? Are there other reasons for bringing the lawsuits in the forums 
that the policyholders’ counsel selected which outweigh the generally unfavora-
ble aspects of litigating in federal court and in states with unfavorable insurance 
laws? 
This Essay attempts to answer those questions. It does so in four parts. Part 
One provides the factual background regarding the COVID-19 business inter-
ruption insurance litigation and the conventional wisdom regarding litigating in 
state court versus federal court, as well as the value in picking the right state. Part 
Two discusses forum shopping in general and the various factors to consider 
when choosing a forum. Part Three reviews the empirical data to determine 
whether the conventional wisdom set forth in Part One is correct. Part Four pro-
vides some possible explanations regarding why policyholders’ counsel brought 
the lawsuits where they did. Ultimately, the Essay concludes that, regardless of 
the merits of policyholders’ COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims, 
many of the policyholders’ chances of winning are likely much lower because 
the cases will be decided in federal court instead of state court, and in states with 
unfavorable insurance laws.  
II. FORUM SHOPPING CONSIDERATIONS  
Because the outcomes of many cases may be different depending upon 
where the lawsuit is filed, forum selection is commonly referred to “forum shop-
ping.”17 By calling it forum shopping, it is implied that an attorney who selec-
tively picks the forum in which to litigate a case is subverting the legal justice 
 
 16. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica M. Salerno, Empirical Analysis of Juries in Tort Cases, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 427 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013) (“When the judge and 
jury agreed on liability . . . juries on average awarded 20% more than the judges reported that they would have 
awarded.”); Kennerly, supra note 11 (“For what it’s worth, though, state courts are typically the home of large 
personal injury verdicts . . . .”). 
 17. See, e.g., Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1683 (1990) (“A court will call a 
practice ‘forum shopping’ when it wishes to paint it as an unsavory machination designed to thwart public policy 
and achieve an unmerited goal. By contrast, it will avoid the label when it considers the reasons behind the forum 
selection reasonable or justified.”); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1995) (“The name of the game is forum-shopping.”); Einer El-
hauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2259 (2002) (describing forum 
shopping as “gam[ing] the process”); Margo E.K. Reder, Punitive Damages as a Necessary Remedy in Broker-
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system by manipulating legal rules in a way that results in an unjust outcome in 
the case.18 The idea that forum shopping results in an outcome that is a subver-
sion of justice is premised, however, on the idea that there is only one just out-
come in each case. Yet, if the laws are different in the various states with an 
interest in the case, then the outcomes could be different in each state. By sug-
gesting only one outcome in a case is just means the laws in any state that would 
lead to a different outcome are unjust. Legislators and judges obviously do not 
agree, or the laws would be uniform in all fifty states. 
Forum shopping also should not be viewed as a subversion of justice be-
cause there are numerous limitations on what is permissible forum shopping to 
ensure the chosen forum is “fair.” For example, the chosen forum must satisfy 
the personal jurisdiction requirement that the defendants have at least minimum 
contacts with the forum state.19 Erie also requires that federal courts apply state 
law when the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citi-
zenship to ensure fairness.20 There also are transfer of venue and forum non-
conveniens rules that ensure the chosen forum satisfies a certain level of fairness 
and convenience for the parties and witnesses.21  
Although one Supreme Court Justice denounced forum shopping as an 
“evil” practice decades ago, the Court has long since recognized the practice as 
legitimate lawyering.22 The law arguably even encourages forum shopping by 
offering numerous potential forums for cases to be brought with only limited 
judicial scrutiny of the plaintiffs’ choices.23 Consequently, competent counsel 
 
Customer Securities Arbitration Cases, 29 IND. L. REV. 105, 127 n.189 (1995) (commenting that choice of law 
clauses are used as part of the “game of forum-shopping”).  
 18. Some of the past criticisms of forum shopping occurred because plaintiffs’ counsel found friendly 
jurisdictions in which to file mass tort claims and the courts in such jurisdictions did not seem to strictly apply 
the rules that required the court to have personal jurisdiction over the parties, as well as the courts’ questionable 
practices regarding the handling of summary judgment motions and the admission of defense evidence at trial. 
Consequently, some jurisdictions were considered “judicial hellholes” by defense counsel. See, e.g., Victor E. 
Schwartz et. al., Asbestos Litigation in Madison County, Illinois: The Challenge Ahead, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 235, 236, 244, 248–250 (2004); 151 CONG. REC. 1626, 1651 (2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) 
(“[T]he minute the lawyers start talking about a class action and they send a demand letter, the companies know 
they are dead if the case is brought in Madison County, IL. No matter how right they may be, they are dead 
because the judges in that particular jurisdiction are in the pockets of the local lawyers with whom the out-of-
State lawyers who have these class actions align themselves in order to go in there and get these outrageous 
verdicts that would not be obtained in any fair court of law.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires . . . that in 
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’”) (citations omitted). 
 20. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 83 (1938).  
 21. See, e.g., Forum Shopping Reconsidered, supra note 17, at 1691; Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 
84 N.C. L. Rev. 333, 344 (2006).  
 22. Compare Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 521 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (referring 
to forum shopping as “the type of evil aimed at in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins [304 U.S. 64 (1938)]”), with Ferens 
v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 531 (1990) (recognizing the Court’s holding effectively rewards forum shop-
ping), and Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984) (recognizing state-by-state forum shopping is 
a common litigation strategy). 
 23. See, e.g., George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn’t a Conservative Court 
Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 649, 673 (1993) (“A number of factors converge to make things easy for 
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who are zealously representing their clients, as counsel are required to do under 
the Rules of Professional conduct, should be forum shopping if there are multiple 
potential forums in which to bring a case.24 Indeed, in some cases, with insurance 
coverage litigation being a prime example, the plaintiff’s ability to pick the fo-
rum is one of the plaintiff’s biggest advantages in the litigation. That advantage 
should not be overlooked.25 
In the context of COVID-19 business interruption insurance cases, there 
are numerous states where the plaintiffs and defendants both have enough legal 
ties to the dispute to allow the lawsuit to be brought in the state. There also are 
multiple venues within the various states in which the lawsuit can be brought. 
Further, many of the cases can be brought in either federal or state court due to 
diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction itself also can be created or de-
stroyed by the plaintiff(s) depending upon the residencies of the plaintiff(s) who 
bring the lawsuit and which defendant(s) the plaintiff(s) decide to sue.  
Consequently, there are numerous questions for counsel to consider when 
selecting the forum in which to sue: 1) which judges are likely to be sympathetic 
or hostile to the plaintiff’s claims, 2) what would be the likely composition of 
the jury in each potential forum, 3) which of the various potentially applicable 
states’ laws are the most favorable and least favorable, and 4) what are the choice 
of law rules in each potential forum and which state’s laws likely would be cho-
sen under each potential forum’s choice of law rule?26  
It is not difficult today to learn about a judge’s legal proclivities by review-
ing the judge’s past opinions and the judge’s profile. In some forums, there may 
be a fairly limited pool of potential judges. If counsel has choices regarding 
where to file a lawsuit and knows which judge likely will hear the case, then 
counsel should consider which judges would be the most favorable for the case. 
One should also consider what type of jury would be best for the case. The 
compositions of the prospective jury pools are different in state and federal courts. 
The composition of the jury is very important to determining the outcomes of 
cases because jurors view the evidence presented through the prisms of their own 
life experiences. With that in mind, would an urban jury or a rural jury be better 
for the plaintiff’s case? For example, a lawsuit brought in state court in Pittsburgh 
would have a jury pool largely comprised of people who live in or around the 
city of Pittsburgh, which has a heavily democratic population that is racially di-
verse. If the same lawsuit were filed in federal court in Pittsburgh, however, then 
 
plaintiffs. These include relaxed standards of personal jurisdiction, the general obligation of states to provide a 
forum, choice of law theories that encourage the use of forum law, and minimal scrutiny by the Supreme Court 
of state choice of law decisions.”). 
 24. See MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 23, at 669 (“[A] recurrent theme in common-law opinions that is directly 
supportive of the practice [of forum shopping]: the maxim that the plaintiff is master of his forum.”) (citing 
The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)). 
 26. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 23, at 653–54 (“A party may seek to derive advantage not only from the 
substantive law, but also from the attitudes of different judges and juries, the length of court dockets, and the 
geographical convenience to itself and its adversary.”). 
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the jury pool would be comprised of people who live in the western half of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which is a primarily white and republican pop-
ulation. So, there would be two very different jury pools for a lawsuit filed in 
Pittsburgh depending upon whether the case is in federal court or state court.  
COVID-19 business interruption insurance claims are governed by state 
law.27 Insurance laws can vary considerably from state to state, sometimes dra-
matically so.28 Thus, counsel should carefully consider which state’s laws are 
the most favorable to policyholders before deciding where to sue. 
Once counsel has determined which state’s laws are the most favorable, 
counsel should then consider how to get that state’s law to apply in the case. That 
means counsel should consider the choice of law rules in each of the potential 
forums where the lawsuit could be brought. In doing so, counsel can then deter-
mine which forum’s choice of law rules would most likely result in the most 
favorable laws being applied. 
III. EMPIRICAL DATA REGARDING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM  
As discussed in Part I, the conventional wisdom provides policyholders 
should be bringing COVID-19 business interruption insurance cases in state 
court. Yet, more than 700 of the 1000-plus cases have been filed in, or removed 
to, federal court. This suggests either the conventional wisdom is wrong or many 
of the policyholders made a mistake by suing in the forums they chose. To figure 
out whether the conventional wisdom is correct, one can consider the empirical 
data regarding the chances of winning when litigating in federal versus state 
court. 
Does empirical data support the conventional wisdom regarding the ad-
vantages of forum shopping and the chances of winning in state versus federal 
court? Yes, and dramatically so.  
 
 27. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 28. Id. One of many examples of insurance law being completely inconsistent in some states is the courts’ 
interpretation in the 1990s of the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion, an exclusion contained in standard 
form CGL policies that was interpreted completely differently by courts throughout the country even though the 
language being interpreted was identical and the facts of the case were often very similar. Compare Hecla Mining 
Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991) (“Although ‘sudden’ can reasonably be defined to mean 
abrupt or immediate, it can also reasonably be defined to mean unexpected and unintended. Since the term ‘sud-
den’ is susceptible to more than one reasonable definition, the term is ambiguous, and we therefore construe the 
phrase ‘sudden and accidental’ against the insurer to mean unexpected and unintended.”), and Claussen v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 690 (Ga. 1989) (“In sum, we conclude that the pollution exclusion clause is 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. The clause must therefore be construed in favor of the insured 
to mean ‘unexpected and unintended.’”), with Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Grp., Inc., 659 A.2d 1295, 1308 
(Md. 1995) (“We agree with the interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause adopted in numerous other 
cases . . . . Under those interpretations, the language of such an exclusion provides coverage only for pollution 
which is both sudden and accidental. It does not apply to gradual pollution carried out on an ongoing basis during 
the course of business.”) (emphasis in original), and Upjohn Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich. 
1991) (“We find persuasive the recent opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which 
find the terms of the pollution exclusion to be unambiguous. We conclude that when considered in its plain and 
easily understood sense, ‘sudden’ is defined with a ‘temporal element that joins together conceptually the imme-
diate and the unexpected.’”) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
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Empirical research published in 2019 reveals that the plaintiffs’ success rate 
in federal court fell from seventy percent in 1985 to thirty percent by 2017.29 
There are numerous theories why this is the case – the appointment of pro-busi-
ness judges, changes in the Rules of Civil Procedure, changes in pleading re-
quirements and the rules related to the granting of motions for summary judg-
ment, the types of cases ultimately being adjudicated in federal court, etc. – but 
the fact remains that plaintiffs currently are losing in federal court by a wide 
margin.30  
Conversely, a study of the outcomes of almost 27,000 civil trials conducted 
in state courts across the country revealed that the plaintiffs won sixty percent of 
the cases overall.31 Another study analyzed a database of three million federal 
cases and concluded that the plaintiff’s chances of winning a case dropped from 
fifty-eight percent to twenty-nine percent if the case was removed from state 
court to federal court.32 
Further, empirical data reveals that: 1) member classes are only certified in 
twenty-four percent of federal class actions, and 2) insurers win seventy-five per-
cent of the breach of contract class actions brought against them in federal 
court.33 Consequently, by bringing many of the COVID-19 business interruption 
lawsuits in federal court, especially as class actions, the empirical data predicts 
that the policyholders’ chances of success are very low. 
In addition to suing in state court in order to increase the chances of success 
in a case, is there a way for plaintiffs’ counsel to get the most favorable laws 
available to apply in the case? Yes, by filing the lawsuit in a state with laws 
favorable to the plaintiffs’ claims. An empirical study regarding choice of law 
decisions for torts cases reveals that, in the forty-two states that do not use the 
lex loci choice of law rule,34 the court chose to apply the laws most favorable to 
the plaintiff eighty-six percent of the time, and those laws usually were also the 
 
 29. See Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Curious Incident of the Falling Win Rate: Individual 
vs System-Level Justification and the Rule of Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1371, 1373 (2019). 
 30. Id. at 1380–1412. 
 31. See LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST,.CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN 
STATE COURTS, 2005 (2008), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC49-43VR]. 
 32. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1507, 1511–12 (1995). 
 33. See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litiga-
tion: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 645 (2006) (“Judges certified 24% of the 
cases as class actions . . . . ”); Willy E. Rice, Allegedly “Biased,” “Intimidating,” and “Incompetent” State Court 
Judges and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly “Impartial” and “Competent” 
Federal Courts – A Historical Perspective and an Empirical Analysis of Class Action Dispositions in Federal 
and State Courts, 1925-2011, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 536 (2012) (“[T]he dispositions of class actions 
involving breach-of-contract claims and the general finding is clear: insurers and corporations are overwhelm-
ingly more likely to prevail in breach-of-contract class actions. More specifically, corporate defendants “win” 
repeatedly and consistently, regardless of (1) whether the breach-of-contract complaints named corporations or 
insurers as class action defendants . . . . [T]he meager “win” ratios for class members . . . are just .250 . . . .”). 
 34. The lex loci choice of law rule, which most states no longer use, dictated that the laws of the state 
where the injury occurred governed for torts claims and the state where the contract was entered governed for 
breach of contract claims. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 378 (1934). 
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laws of the state in which the case was filed.35 Indeed, the ability to litigate in a 
forum that will apply the laws most favorable to the plaintiffs is one of the pri-
mary reasons why plaintiffs should forum shop.36 
By abandoning the lex loci choice of law rule, the modern choice of law 
rules used in most states, which focus on the various interests and contacts of 
each state that has an interest in the case, incentivize plaintiffs to shop for a fa-
vorable forum because the standards are malleable enough to arguably support 
whichever state has the most favorable laws for the plaintiffs.37 For example, 
under the Second Restatement, there are seven principles generally “relevant to 
the choice of applicable rule of law,” which include considerations such as the 
“policies of … interested states,” “the protection of justified expectations,” and 
“certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.”38  
With respect to contracts in particular, if the contract does not specify 
which state’s laws govern (and most business interruption insurance policies do 
not), the Second Restatement provides five factors to consider when analyzing 
the seven general overriding principles: “[1] the place of contracting, [2] the 
place of negotiation of the contract, [3] the place of performance, [4] the location 
of the subject matter of the contract, and [5] the domicile, residence, nationality, 
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.”39 Thus, when decid-
ing which law to apply, courts typically analyze the contacts of the relative states 
and parties in connection with the dispute in light of these factors. 
In addition to the twelve factors discussed above, the Second Restatement 
also has a section that specifically applies to disputes that involve property in-
surance policies, such as business interruption policies.40 That section provides: 
[T]he local law of the state which the parties understood was to be the prin-
cipal location of the insured risk during the term of the policy, unless with 
respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant rela-
tionship under the principles stated in §6 to the transaction, in which event 
the local law of the other state will be applied.41  
Thus, under this rule, the principal location of the insured risk is presumed 
to have the most “significant relationship” and, consequently, that state’s law 
often applies. A showing that another state has a more significant relationship to 
the dispute, however, can defeat that presumption and lead to another state’s laws 
being applied.  
 
 35. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in Cross-Border Torts: Why Plaintiffs Win and Should, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 380, 383 (2009) (analyzing choice of law decisions in tort cases in the forty-two states 
where courts do not use the lex loci choice of law rule); Brown, supra note 23, at 667 (“Every forum is likely to 
be biased in favor of its own law . . . .”). 
 36. See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 
78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 88 (1999) (“A review of reported cases in which forum shopping has been discussed reveals 
that the most common motive for forum shopping is selection of the law to be applied to the case.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW §§ 6, 188, 193 (1971). 
 38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (1971). 
 39. Id. at § 188.  
 40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 193 (1971). 
 41. Id.  
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In short, because the current choice of law rules are multi-factor standards 
that are very malleable, creative counsel can present arguments that the laws of 
some state different from the state of the principal location of the insured prop-
erty should apply. For example, sometimes the policyholder has insured property 
located in multiple states, so no single state is the principal location of the insured 
property and thus, no specific state’s law is presumed to apply. In addition, the 
states in which the policyholder’s principal place of business is located or in 
which the policyholder is incorporated also have important interests in insurance 
disputes because those states have significant interests in ensuring their citizens’ 
insurance contracts are enforced. The state where the policyholder’s injury oc-
curred also has an interest in vindicating the rights of the policyholder, as a party 
who was injured in the state. The policyholder’s customers’ states also have in-
terests in the policyholder’s insurance claims being paid, particularly if the busi-
ness cannot survive without the insurance proceeds. And, of course, the states in 
which the insurer is incorporated or has its principal place of business also have 
significant interests in insurance cases because the contract rights and obligations 
of their citizens are at stake. 
In sum, because the current choice of law rules are flexible, the conven-
tional wisdom and empirical data dictate that policyholders should sue in state 
court in the state with the most favorable laws if possible, particularly in light of 
the fact that courts typically apply the law of the forum state. What does a poli-
cyholder have to lose by doing so? Primarily, just the costs associated with 
fighting a forum battle. Fighting and winning that battle, however, may be the 
difference between winning and losing the entire case. Consequently, it is often 
money well spent. So, the question remains – why are more than 700 of the 1000-
plus COVID-19 business interruption insurance cases in federal court, with many 
of them in states generally considered unfavorable to policyholders with respect 
to insurance law? The next part provides some potential answers to that question. 
IV. EXPLANATIONS FOR POLICYHOLDERS’ COUNSEL’S DECISIONS TO SUE IN 
FEDERAL COURT 
Federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over COVID-19 business 
interruption insurance claims because the claims will be governed by state law, 
so suing in state court is an option in every one of the cases. If plaintiffs win sixty 
percent of the time in state court and lose seventy to seventy-five percent of the 
time in federal court, then counsel would sue in federal court only if they were 
unaware of that statistic, were unable to sue in state court for some reason, or had 
a reason to believe the historical statistics do not apply to the case at issue for 
some reason (e.g., familiarity with the judge or the judge’s past rulings regarding 
insurance matters). 
A.  Uninformed 
The first possible explanation is that the policyholders’ attorneys were un-
aware of the conventional wisdom regarding the advantages of suing in state 
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court and avoiding federal court. This is an ungenerous explanation, but it is 
plausible for some of the cases.  
Another possibility is that counsel filed in federal court because there was 
diversity of citizenship between the policyholder and the insurer and counsel ex-
pected the insurer to remove the case to federal court. So, by filing in federal 
court, counsel was able to avoid the delay associated with the removal process.  
That, however, is a poor reason to sue in federal court in the first instance 
because a policyholder often can defeat diversity of citizenship jurisdiction by 
including non-diverse parties in the litigation – either as defendants or plain-
tiffs.42 Literally hundreds of policyholders across the country have filed nearly 
identical business interruption insurance cases based upon COVID-19 govern-
ment-ordered shutdowns under identical or similar policy language, so finding 
at least one non-diverse plaintiff to include in the lawsuit should not have been 
difficult. On the defendant side of the case, the policyholders also could, for ex-
ample, add their local insurance broker as a defendant if the broker failed to pro-
cure business interruption insurance that provides the coverage the policyholder 
expected. Doing so would destroy diversity jurisdiction and prevent the removal 
of the case to federal court. Further, even if the policyholder did not, or could 
not, properly add a non-diverse party to the case in order to destroy diversity of 
citizenship, an insurer cannot successfully remove a state court case to federal 
court if the case is filed in the insurer’s home state.43 
In addition, a policyholder often can avoid removal to federal court by 
bringing only a declaratory judgment action against the insurer in state court in-
stead of suing for breach of contract. Federal courts have discretion to decide 
whether to adjudicate declaratory judgment actions when they are removed from 
state court.44 The trend, however, has been for federal courts to decline to exer-
cise that discretion when the case is an insurance coverage action involving novel 
issues of state law, such as the COVID-19 business interruption cases, because 
state courts are in a better position than federal courts to address novel issues of 
state law.45  
 
 42. There is not a consensus among the courts regarding whether removal is appropriate if the out-of-state 
plaintiffs in a case have separate claims against the non-diverse defendant. See, e.g., Tarifa B. Laddon & Lexi C. 
Fuson, Fraudulent Misjoinder in Drug and Device Litigation, FOR DEFENSE (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.faegredrinker.com/files/133525_FTD-1709-Laddon-Fuson.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB89-PK7L]; 
see generally Matthew C. Monahan, De-Frauding the System: Sham Plaintiffs and the Fraudulent Joinder Doc-
trine, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2012). Even in jurisdictions that disapprove of the practice of multiple plaintiffs 
with separate claims against the defendant filing their claims together in a single lawsuit, the plaintiff can still 
prevent removal by suing the defendant in state court in the defendant’s home state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) 
(“A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title [di-
versity of citizenship] may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defend-
ants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”).  
 43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 
 44.    See Monahan, supra note 42, at 1343, 1348.  
 45. See, e.g., Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d 129, 149 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen applicable state 
law is ‘uncertain or undetermined, district courts should be particularly reluctant’ to exercise [declaratory judg-
ment action] jurisdiction”) (quoting State Auto Ins. Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitcheson 
v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that state courts should address unresolved state law issues 
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With respect to the reason many of the cases were filed in states with unfa-
vorable insurance laws, it is possible that the laws of all the potentially available 
states were unfavorable to the policyholders, so the policyholders’ counsel were 
left with only poor choices. Or, perhaps the policyholders’ attorneys were not 
aware that courts routinely apply the laws of the forum state regardless of where 
the parties are domiciled. Perhaps counsels also were not aware of how easy it is 
to satisfy the minimum contacts requirements for personal jurisdiction, so they 
did not even consider suing in any state other than the policyholder’s home state.  
B.  Inexperienced  
Another possible explanation for the filing of so many lawsuits in federal 
court, and in states with insurance laws unfavorable to policyholders, is that 
many of the attorneys who have brought the COVID-19 business interruption 
insurance cases do not have much experience handling complex insurance cov-
erage matters. Insurers and their attorneys are repeat players when it comes to 
coverage litigation, but there are not that many attorneys who regularly handle 
complex insurance coverage cases nationwide on behalf of policyholders, espe-
cially business interruption cases.  
In reviewing the backgrounds of the attorneys who have brought many of 
the COVID-19 business interruption lawsuits, it is clear that many, if not most, 
of them do not have national reputations for handling insurance coverage cases.46 
Indeed, the law firm that has filed the most cases specializes in class action work, 
not complex insurance disputes.47 Other firms that have brought a lot of the cases 
appear to primarily handle general, local legal work or are personal injury law 
firms that apparently just filed the cases in their home states.48 Another firm, 
which has brought more than a dozen cases, is comprised of a total of two law-
yers and one paralegal.49 
One of the consequences of using counsel who only have experience liti-
gating in their home states, or are not insurance law specialists, is that they may 
not be aware of the differences in the insurance laws from state to state. They 
also may not have experience, through the school of hard knocks, figuring out 
how to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements necessary to bring the cases in fa-
vorable states, which may not necessarily be the most obvious forums in which 
to bring the cases. They also may not have experience structuring cases in a way 
that prevents the cases from being removed to federal court or transferred to an-
other forum. 
 
in the first instance rather than federal courts, in directing the District Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in 
an insurance coverage declaratory judgment action). 
 46. See Plaintiff Law Firms, UNIV. PENN. CAREY L. SCH., https://cclt.law.upenn.edu/plaintiff-law-firms/ 
[https://perma.cc/6HFZ-Q92S] (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. 
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Indeed, perhaps policyholders’ counsel filed their lawsuits in federal court 
as class actions based on the assumption that the insurer or insurers would re-
move the cases to federal court based on the minimal diversity of citizenship 
requirement for federal class actions.50 So, perhaps they thought it would be ex-
peditious to simply file in federal court in the first instance to avoid wasting the 
time associated with the removal process due to the urgency of getting the cases 
resolved for their clients who desperately need the insurance money.  
To avoid removal to federal court even if the case is brought as a class 
action, however, the policyholders’ counsel could have brought the class actions 
only on behalf of in-state policyholders and sued the insurer in the insurer’s home 
state. Such cases are not as easily removed to federal court.51 Of course, in light 
of the difficulties associated with preventing the removal of class actions to fed-
eral court, and the dramatically low success rate of federal class actions against 
insurers, perhaps the COVID-19 business interruption insurance cases should not 
have been filed as class actions at all. This conclusion invites the question of why 
so many of the cases were brought as federal class actions. The next part of the 
Essay provides some potential answers to that question. 
C.  Greed  
One reason why policyholders’ counsel may have brought so many of the 
lawsuits in federal court as class actions could be to increase the dollar value of 
the litigation, which in turn would increase the attorneys’ fees if there were a 
favorable resolution of the litigation. Although the dollar amounts of the business 
interruption losses for each individual policyholder may be significant to the in-
dividual policyholders, the amounts at issue for many of the policyholders may 
not be large enough to entice counsel to pursue the cases individually. So, coun-
sel may have brought class actions to increase the value of the litigation.  
As noted above, the cases likely were brought in federal court because fed-
eral class action law – the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 – would have al-
lowed the insurers to remove most of the cases if they had been brought in state 
court unless all of the parties were predominantly from the same state, such that 
the interests in the cases were local, not national.52 Further, counsel also may 
have rapidly filed so many federal class actions in a race to accumulate as many 
cases as possible in an attempt to be appointed lead class counsel, again to in-
crease the potential payout to the lawyers if the litigation were successful. 
It will be a pyrrhic victory for the policyholders’ counsel, however, to be 
named lead class counsel only to subsequently lose the entire case because the 
law applied by the federal court is unfavorable to the policyholders or due to the 
general lack of success federal class action plaintiffs have in cases brought 
against insurers. Bringing smaller class actions comprised of policyholders from 
the same states in state court or bringing actions on behalf of single or multiple 
 
 50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). 
 51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). 
 52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). 
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individual policyholders in state court likely would have increased the policy-
holders’ chances for favorable outcomes even though doing so would not have 
presented the opportunity for as large a payout for counsel. 
Did attorney fees issues also play a role in the filing of some of the individ-
ual cases in federal court? Perhaps. As discussed above, a plaintiff can always 
sue a diverse defendant in state court in the defendant’s home state in order to 
deprive the defendant of the ability to remove the case to federal court.53 But, if 
the policyholder’s counsel does not practice law in the defendant’s home state, 
then it will need to hire local counsel or refer the case to another attorney located 
in the defendant’s home state. In either scenario, the policyholder’s counsel loses 
attorney fees.  
So, if the case is being handled on an hourly basis, then it is in counsel’s 
own financial interest to file the case in its home state even though it may not be 
in the policyholder’s best interests to do so in many cases. If the case is being 
handled on a contingency fee basis, then it is in neither counsel’s nor the policy-
holder’s best financial interest to file the case in federal court in the policy-
holder’s and counsel’s home state in most cases because neither the policyholder 
nor counsel will recover anything if the case is unsuccessful, as the empirical 
data predicts it will be.  
D.  Unconventional Wisdom  
The most generous explanations regarding why many of the COVID-19 
business interruption lawsuits were filed in federal court in unfavorable states are 
because counsel basically had no better choices or they had reason to believe that 
the judges who would be assigned to the cases would be more favorable than the 
alternatives. With respect to the first explanation, one possibility is that state 
courts were closed due to the pandemic when counsel was ready to file the com-
plaints, but federal courts were accepting the electronic filing of complaints, so 
counsel simply filed the lawsuits in the only courthouses open at the time. Hope-
fully, however, policyholders’ counsel did not concede the advantages of a state 
court forum solely for the convenience of immediately commencing the actions 
in federal court.  
Another possibility is that there was complete diversity of citizenship and 
a lack of personal jurisdiction by the state courts over some of the parties in any 
state other than the one in which the lawsuit was filed. That, however, is an un-
likely scenario because there typically are at least two states, and often more, that 
can satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirement if there is diversity of citizen-
ship – the policyholder’s home state and the insurer’s home state.  
Or, perhaps all the potential states were equally unfavorable to the policy-
holder, so it did not matter in which state the case was filed. Yet, that explanation 
still does not explain why more than 700 of the cases are in federal court where 
the policyholder’s chances of winning are exceptionally low. As discussed in 
 
 53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 
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Part IV.A., there are ways to prevent removal from state court to federal court 
that can be accomplished in compliance with the rules. And, of course, the poli-
cyholder can always file in state court in the insurer’s home state without the risk 
of removal.54  
Because this part of the Essay is, however, intended to provide generous 
explanations for what otherwise would appear to be by poor choices by many 
attorneys, one may assume that counsel had reason to believe the state court 
judges in the states where the cases could be filed would favor the insurers. So, 
despite being very low, they thought their chances of winning in federal court 
were still better than in state court. 
Another generous explanation is that counsel had reason to believe the fed-
eral judges assigned to the cases would be pro-policyholder. That explanation, 
however, seems unlikely for most of the cases because counsel typically do not 
know in advance which judge will be assigned to the case, and many of the cases 
were brought in courts that have numerous judges.55 Further, how likely is it that 
more than 700 of the 1000-plus cases are in federal court because the policy-
holder’s counsel believed that each of the federal judges who would be assigned 
to each of the cases would be pro-policyholder? If the defendant historically wins 
seventy percent of the time in federal court in individual cases and insurer-de-
fendants win seventy-five percent of the class actions brought against them in 
federal court, then what are the odds that the federal judges assigned to the 
COVID-19 business interruption cases would be the judges who preside in the 
meager twenty-five to thirty percent of the cases that policyholders win in federal 
court against insurers? 
V. CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom, which is supported by empirical data, provides 
that a plaintiff’s chances of winning are twice as high in state court than in federal 
court. The COVID-19 business interruption insurance cases are governed by 
state law, and state insurance laws vary considerably, with some states being 
favorable to policyholders and others being unfavorable. With forum shopping, 
plaintiffs often have many choices regarding where they can bring a lawsuit, in-
cluding choices regarding the states in which to bring the cases and whether to 
bring the cases in federal or state court.  
Of the over 1000 COVID-19 business interruption insurance cases filed 
thus far, more than 700 of them were filed in, or removed to, federal court and 
many of them were filed in states with generally unfavorable insurance laws from 
the policyholders’ perspective. There are a number of explanations regarding 
why this has happened, but most of them are unflattering to the attorneys bring-
ing the lawsuits, and most of the explanations do not overcome the conventional 
wisdom and empirical data that provide the cases should have been filed as non-
 
 54. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 
 55. See CCLT Case List, supra note 7. 
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removable cases in state court in states with insurance laws favorable to policy-
holders, if possible. Consequently, the policyholders whose cases are pending in 
federal court can only hope that the unflattering explanations are wrong because 
their counsel possess unconventional wisdom, and, consequently, their cases will 
be among the twenty-five to thirty percent of the cases where the plaintiffs are 
successful in federal court.  
